Post by The High Commissioner on Jan 5, 2020 12:16:40 GMT
When England orders her fleet in Edinburgh to the Norwegian Sea, and her fleet in London to the North Sea, she is using openings that are categorised as being "Northern openings". There are two openings: the Churchill Opening has her army in Liverpool move to Edinburgh, and the Tyne Opening has her army move to Yorkshire.
Northern openings are the most used openings for England. Part of this is that she needs try to get her 'natural' supply centre of Norway. Both openings allow her to do this in most cases, although she may need to use both fleets to succeed if Russia orders her army in Moscow to St Petersburg in Spring 1901.
Both Northern openings also give England a chance to take Belgium in 1901. The problem with taking Belgium and when using a Northern opening is that England can only bring one unit to bear on Belgium and she is possibly going to face at least an equal force from either France or Germany. If she is aiming for Belgium, and using a Northern opening, then England must either be feeling pretty certain of support from France or Germany, or else be part of a triple alliance (the Western Triple) with her two 'immediate' neighbours.
Northern openings are safe openings, as long as England is sure of France not ordering her fleet in Brest to the English Channel. Whether France should move to the Channel is another matter, and whether England should be worried if she does is yet another. But, if England finds herself using a Northern opening and a French fleet in the Channel, something is likely to have gone wrong!
This safety is probably what explains why the Northern openings are so well liked by many players. England gets her build (by gaining Norway) and she hasn't necessarily upset anyone. Everyone expects England to take Norway, that's why it's a 'natural' English gain. What the Northern openings don't do is deal with France, and if you're one of those players who think England should deal with France before anyone else, if you use a Northern opening then you're either happy to deal with France from 1902 onward or you're not sure what you're doing.
So, if you're going to use one of the Northern openings, which is the best?
The Churchill Opening - F(Edi)-NWG, F(Lon)-NTH, A(Lpl)-Edi
Named because the UK's WWII Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had a plan to invade Nazi controlled Norway, I don't see a reason to rename it. I don't like using non-WWI era names for either openings or alliances myself, but the name differentiates it from any other opening in Dip, so it'll do.
The idea of this opening should be that England is looking to get an army into Norway. England has the option of using either fleet to convoy the army to Norway. There is a lot of flexibility in using this opening; in F01 can England can order:
The point is that England is looking to occupy Norway with an army - why else move that army to Edinburgh in S01?
The question is, what will Russia make of this opening? No Russia in her right mind is going to agree to it, even if England pushes the third option, using the opening as a way to attack Germany. The reason for this is that, should England seek to put an army in Norway, this borders directly onto St Petersburg; while a fleet there does the same thing, that fleet can only get into St Petersburg, it can't travel south, whereas an army can access Moscow and Livonia from St Petersburg.
England can guarantee Norway with this opening, if she uses both fleets and uses the last option. But that is the only way and she has put Russia under immense pressure. She'll need to be in a sound alliance with Germany to make this work.
Let's look at the first option. This is clearly anti-Russian and relies on Russia not moving her Muscovite army to St Petersburg. Should Russia do that, then England won't take Norway. There shouldn't be any doubt about this: only a complete idiot controlling Russia would allow this to happen if she can prevent it. She'll build in St Petersburg and, although that may not be enough to prevent F(BAR) S A Nwy-StP (or vice versa) she has a good chance of doing so.
Option 2 - when the army is convoyed by the fleet in Norwegian Sea and England moves her North Sea fleet to Skaggerak - is known as the BOHAS Opening. This is a strong attack on Russia because it means England has two units bordering Sweden and possible support German in units in the Baltic Sea and/or Denmark. England is likely to move F(NWG)-BAR and take Sweden. This is a tough position for Russia but still isn't necessarily fatal.
With option 3 England is probably in alliance with Russia against Germany. The best option is to go for Denmark in this situation, as Russia may be persuaded (if she's pretty dumb) to allow Germany into Sweden while she orders her Gulf of Bothnia fleet to the Baltic Sea. However, this kind of combination it better served by England not convoying her army to Norway... and so is better with the Tyne Opening as described below.
The fourth and fifth options are pretty pointless. Yes, one can guarantee Norway but (option 5), even if Russia tries to prevent it and either France or Germany attack the North Sea, but this results in such a slow attack on Russia that it isn't worth the while.
The Churchill Opening gives England some flexibility when it comes to attacking Norway and allows her to land an army there. But, as we'll see below, the Tyne Opening provides a different kind of flexibility and allows England to defend London if need be. The question is, then, does England need an army to move into St Petersburg, which is the only real reason for the Churchill Opening?
The Tyne Opening - F(Edi)-NWG, F(Lon)-NTH, A(Lpl)-Yor
The River Tyne isn't in Yorkshire at all but in Tyneside and it goes through the city of Newcastle. However, on the Dip map, it falls into Yorkshire's space (the northern area of the space) and, as this is the Northern opening linked with A(Lpl)-Yor, I chose the name.
England can still get her army into Norway if she wants, although with less flexibility, and should she want an army convoying elsewhere, she can still achieve that. However, she also has the option of defending London with this opening, which might be necessary if a French fleet occupies the Channel. So, with the Tyne Opening, England's options are:
You can see that the key difference here is that England can defend London if France moves into the Channel. She can also do that with a Churchill Opening, of course, by ordering F(NTH)-Lon in F01 but this is a waste of the fleet - why move it out of London to be forced to move it back? It simply makes you look stupid. A French player, faced with her fleet in the Channel and knowing England can only defend London by ordering F(NTH-Lon), will allow England's move to succeed.
With the Tyne Opening, England's army can defend London. England can guarantee London is defended and and kept free for a build by ordering A(Yor)-Lon, F(NTH)-Lon but, again, why? Using that fleet simply means it's not being used where it should be.
It is a question as to whether it is better to order A(Yor)-Lon in F01 if England finds a French fleet in the Channel, or to gamble on France not ordering ENG-Lon, and that question can only be answered at the time. If A(Yor)-Lon succeeds, ie France doesn't order F(ENG)-Lon, then London is occupied and England can't build a fleet there. But it is a risk: if France has moved to the Channel, she is aiming for London or Belgium, and probably the former. So it will come down to will England's cause be bettered by using the army elsewhere or by potentially occupying London?
Of course, England can defend the Channel simply by ordering F(Lon)ENG in S01, but that has it's own risks. The last thing England should be looking for is a bounce(2) in the Channel! (I'll discuss this more under Southern openings.) And unless England uses a Northern opening she can't rely on taking Norway at all.
If England uses either Northern opening, she is looking to secure Norway and is not interested in going after France immediately. The downside of a Northern opening is that England is not going to be able to go after France very quickly, so that is a problem that she must feel she can resolve later in the game. Northern openings are safe openings and predictable, so England must make the most of them.
One question remains: Assuming England is going after Norway, does she occupy it with an army or a fleet?
There are two reasons for England to occupy Norway in 1901: to get a safe(ish) SC and/or to move against Russia. Occupying Norway is the launchpad for an attack on Russia, so let's assume that this is the objective. First Norway, then St Petersburg; if England is thinking first Norway, then Sweden, then St Petersburg, she is being more long-term in her thinking... but also leaving herself more vulnerable.
If England occupies Norway with an army, she is giving herself a fair chance of getting that army into St Petersburg. As mentioned above, this offers more opportunities to occupy Russian space. The problem is that, as soon as an army lands in Norway, England is telegraphing her intent.
In actuality, a fleet occupying Norway is no less of a threat to St Petersburg as an army. The difference is that, once an English fleet occupies St Petersburg, it is stuck. It can't move forward. This is known as the "St Petersburg Cul-de-sac".
So, it has to be an army in Norway and then St Petersburg, doesn't it? Don't want to be trapped in the cul-de-sac, after all. And that is why a number of writers and commentators tell us it has to be an army in Norway if England wants to take St Petersburg.
Well, here's the thing: if England gets her army into St Petersburg, what does she do with it? Does it push south into Moscow? Maybe Livonia? After all, that's the aim of getting it there. And, if you're England, how do you achieve this?
Being realistic, England isn't going to be able to take Moscow on her own for a number of turns. Russia is going to have enough power in Moscow to hold England off - it only takes one, after all.
So, Livonia, then. That clears St Petersburg for, presumably, a second army to come in behind the first. But that's going to take some time in itself. And the assumption must be English armies in Livonia and St Petersburg will be enough to take Moscow on their own, which is unlikely.
The only way England is going to make progress against Russia in the early part of the Mid-game is if she gets help, and the three candidates for this are Germany, Austria or Turkey, with Germany being the most likely. England orders StP-Lvn, helps Germany take Warsaw, then Germany helps England take Moscow. Fairly uncomplicated.
However, this seems unlikely to me, unless things in the south are incredibly helpful. If England and Germany are in St Petersburg and Warsaw, Russia is most likely fatally wounded, which should mean that her southern enemies have take advantage of that. It's entirely possible that Galicia, Ukraine and Sevastopol are all occupied by enemy powers, and probably that at least two of the three are. Russia may only hold Moscow at this point.
Given this, Moscow is the prize. I can see the argument that Germany might help England take Moscow, but she might just as easily have formed an agreement with Austria to take it herself (or temporarily[?] give it to Austria). If there is no double dealing here from Germany, then the Anglo-German alliance (that I call the Saxon Alliance) is likely to face the an Austro-Turkish alliance (the Osturk Alliance) competing for Moscow. I feel, then, that England faces a long haul to take Moscow at this point in the game so why waste the time trying to take it?
The additional factor to getting an army into St Petersburg this early on is that, even if England is aiming to move it south immediately (and if she isn't, then surely it can be put to better use elsewhere?), she's going to be pressured to do something with it. Germany will want to push east and want English support; Austria or Turkey may want to push into Russia and want English support. This may be something England is prepared to do, of course, and it may be the key to forming a positive relationship with another power, but in the long term, getting Germany into Warsaw, or Austria/Turkey into Moscow, is going to make things trickier later in the game when England is going to be looking to take Moscow. And if England decides that she doesn't want to help her opponents, then she's damaging potential relationships.
Given this, and the fact that a fleet in St Petersburg is absolutely no use for further progress against Russia, should England even be looking to take St Petersburg? A lot of writers say not. There is some disagreement as to whether should look to take Norway, although I think it's generally accepted that England runs a risk by not doing so. But St Petersburg is another matter: stay clear is what a lot of advice says.
I disagree. If England is in Norway, if she has the chance of taking St Petersburg and she doesn't see a downside to damaging Russia, England she take St Petersburg, whether with a fleet or an army. For me, it I'd be perfectly happy with a fleet in St Petersburg at this stage of the game because it gives England a chance (even if only a slim one) to persuade Russia that St Petersburg's gone but that's the end of it.
Let's be pragmatic: Norway and St Petersburg are SCs. Taking them adds to England's strength. While she may be able to gain SCs elsewhere, of she takes Norway and St Petersburg with fleets, they are pretty much self-sustaining (admittedly, she'll possibly need a third unit in the region to guarantee this).
At this point in the game, it really doesn't matter if a fleet sits in St Petersburg. Assuming England makes good progress, she should find the opportunity later in the game to get an army into St Petersburg and use it to take Moscow then. This will probably depend upon England being in complete control of the northern seas but, really, that's what she ought to be aiming for anyway.
Part of the problem with commentary the is against England taking St Petersburg with a fleet in the early stages of a game is that it is based on a faulty philosophy that England needs armies just as much as fleets in the Early and early Mid-game. She doesn't. England needs fleets. She's a maritime power, she doesn't need to take inland SCs at this point. She will do, eventually, but she's not going to find it easy until she's secured the seas and the easier to grab coastal SCs. Throwing English armies onto the Continent is a mistake, as it leaves her vulnerable and there's no reason why it can't be done later in the game. It isn't coincidence that England finds survival comparatively easy but victory comparatively difficult: she's often played as if she were France, or Italy, where a balanced build strategy makes sense, or by people who think grabbing inland SCs and getting armies into play is important. Let the continental powers fight over the inland SCs and establish England's powerbase by taking coastal ones - with fleets.
Of the Northern openings, then, England's best option is probably the Tyne opening. It doesn't compromise the taking of Norway, and in fact is the only opening that will guarantee it if it's followed by F(NTH) C Yor-Nwy, F(NWG) S Yor-Nwy OR F(NWG) S NTH-Nwy, which frees A(Yor) to defend London if need be. It's this potential defence of London that makes the Tyne superior to the Churchill.
Northern openings are the most used openings for England. Part of this is that she needs try to get her 'natural' supply centre of Norway. Both openings allow her to do this in most cases, although she may need to use both fleets to succeed if Russia orders her army in Moscow to St Petersburg in Spring 1901.
Both Northern openings also give England a chance to take Belgium in 1901. The problem with taking Belgium and when using a Northern opening is that England can only bring one unit to bear on Belgium and she is possibly going to face at least an equal force from either France or Germany. If she is aiming for Belgium, and using a Northern opening, then England must either be feeling pretty certain of support from France or Germany, or else be part of a triple alliance (the Western Triple) with her two 'immediate' neighbours.
Northern openings are safe openings, as long as England is sure of France not ordering her fleet in Brest to the English Channel. Whether France should move to the Channel is another matter, and whether England should be worried if she does is yet another. But, if England finds herself using a Northern opening and a French fleet in the Channel, something is likely to have gone wrong!
This safety is probably what explains why the Northern openings are so well liked by many players. England gets her build (by gaining Norway) and she hasn't necessarily upset anyone. Everyone expects England to take Norway, that's why it's a 'natural' English gain. What the Northern openings don't do is deal with France, and if you're one of those players who think England should deal with France before anyone else, if you use a Northern opening then you're either happy to deal with France from 1902 onward or you're not sure what you're doing.
So, if you're going to use one of the Northern openings, which is the best?
The Churchill Opening - F(Edi)-NWG, F(Lon)-NTH, A(Lpl)-Edi
Named because the UK's WWII Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had a plan to invade Nazi controlled Norway, I don't see a reason to rename it. I don't like using non-WWI era names for either openings or alliances myself, but the name differentiates it from any other opening in Dip, so it'll do.
The idea of this opening should be that England is looking to get an army into Norway. England has the option of using either fleet to convoy the army to Norway. There is a lot of flexibility in using this opening; in F01 can England can order:
- F(NWG)-BAR, F(NTH) C Edi-Nwy: which is a clear threat to Russia as it threatens St Petersburg.
- F(NWG) C Edi-Nwy; F(NTH)-SKA: which is also a clear threat to Russia as it threatens Sweden (the BOHAS Opening).
- F(NWG) C Edi-Nwy; F(NTH)-Den/Hol: which is also a threat to Russia and an attack on Germany.
- F(NWG) C Edi-Nwy; F(NTH) S Edi-Nwy: which is the clearest threat to Russia.
- F(NWG) S Edi-Nwy; F(NTH) C Edi-Nwy: which is also a threat to Russia but a pretty weak one on its own.
The point is that England is looking to occupy Norway with an army - why else move that army to Edinburgh in S01?
The question is, what will Russia make of this opening? No Russia in her right mind is going to agree to it, even if England pushes the third option, using the opening as a way to attack Germany. The reason for this is that, should England seek to put an army in Norway, this borders directly onto St Petersburg; while a fleet there does the same thing, that fleet can only get into St Petersburg, it can't travel south, whereas an army can access Moscow and Livonia from St Petersburg.
England can guarantee Norway with this opening, if she uses both fleets and uses the last option. But that is the only way and she has put Russia under immense pressure. She'll need to be in a sound alliance with Germany to make this work.
Let's look at the first option. This is clearly anti-Russian and relies on Russia not moving her Muscovite army to St Petersburg. Should Russia do that, then England won't take Norway. There shouldn't be any doubt about this: only a complete idiot controlling Russia would allow this to happen if she can prevent it. She'll build in St Petersburg and, although that may not be enough to prevent F(BAR) S A Nwy-StP (or vice versa) she has a good chance of doing so.
Option 2 - when the army is convoyed by the fleet in Norwegian Sea and England moves her North Sea fleet to Skaggerak - is known as the BOHAS Opening. This is a strong attack on Russia because it means England has two units bordering Sweden and possible support German in units in the Baltic Sea and/or Denmark. England is likely to move F(NWG)-BAR and take Sweden. This is a tough position for Russia but still isn't necessarily fatal.
With option 3 England is probably in alliance with Russia against Germany. The best option is to go for Denmark in this situation, as Russia may be persuaded (if she's pretty dumb) to allow Germany into Sweden while she orders her Gulf of Bothnia fleet to the Baltic Sea. However, this kind of combination it better served by England not convoying her army to Norway... and so is better with the Tyne Opening as described below.
The fourth and fifth options are pretty pointless. Yes, one can guarantee Norway but (option 5), even if Russia tries to prevent it and either France or Germany attack the North Sea, but this results in such a slow attack on Russia that it isn't worth the while.
The Churchill Opening gives England some flexibility when it comes to attacking Norway and allows her to land an army there. But, as we'll see below, the Tyne Opening provides a different kind of flexibility and allows England to defend London if need be. The question is, then, does England need an army to move into St Petersburg, which is the only real reason for the Churchill Opening?
The Tyne Opening - F(Edi)-NWG, F(Lon)-NTH, A(Lpl)-Yor
The River Tyne isn't in Yorkshire at all but in Tyneside and it goes through the city of Newcastle. However, on the Dip map, it falls into Yorkshire's space (the northern area of the space) and, as this is the Northern opening linked with A(Lpl)-Yor, I chose the name.
England can still get her army into Norway if she wants, although with less flexibility, and should she want an army convoying elsewhere, she can still achieve that. However, she also has the option of defending London with this opening, which might be necessary if a French fleet occupies the Channel. So, with the Tyne Opening, England's options are:
- F(NWG)-BAR, F(NTH) C Yor-Nwy: which is a threat to Russia, also known as the Eastern Push Opening.
- F(NWG)-BAR, F(NTH)-Nwy, A(Yor)-Lon/H: which is a threat to Russia but not as dangerous as facing an army in Norway.
- F(NWG) S Yor-Nwy; F(NTH) C Yor-Nwy: can almost guarantee Norway, unless a Franco-German attack dislodges the North Sea fleet.
- F(NWG) S NTH-Nwy; A(Yor)-Lon/H: absolutely guarantees Norway and defends London but runs the threat of losing the North Sea.
- F(NWG)-Nwy; F(NTH) S NWG-Nwy, A(Yor)-Lon/H: again, all but guarantees Norway and also defends London.
- F(NWG)-Nwy; F(NTH) C Yor-Bel/Hol/Den: is anti-German (potentially anti-French is the army lands in Belgium).
- F(NWG)-Nwy; F(NTH)-Bel/Hol/Den, A(Yor)-Lon/H: as above and defends London.
- F(NWG)-Nwy; F(NTH)-SKA, A(Yor)-Lon/H: may be the start of a Magdeburg Opening with England and Russia attacking Germany.
You can see that the key difference here is that England can defend London if France moves into the Channel. She can also do that with a Churchill Opening, of course, by ordering F(NTH)-Lon in F01 but this is a waste of the fleet - why move it out of London to be forced to move it back? It simply makes you look stupid. A French player, faced with her fleet in the Channel and knowing England can only defend London by ordering F(NTH-Lon), will allow England's move to succeed.
With the Tyne Opening, England's army can defend London. England can guarantee London is defended and and kept free for a build by ordering A(Yor)-Lon, F(NTH)-Lon but, again, why? Using that fleet simply means it's not being used where it should be.
It is a question as to whether it is better to order A(Yor)-Lon in F01 if England finds a French fleet in the Channel, or to gamble on France not ordering ENG-Lon, and that question can only be answered at the time. If A(Yor)-Lon succeeds, ie France doesn't order F(ENG)-Lon, then London is occupied and England can't build a fleet there. But it is a risk: if France has moved to the Channel, she is aiming for London or Belgium, and probably the former. So it will come down to will England's cause be bettered by using the army elsewhere or by potentially occupying London?
Of course, England can defend the Channel simply by ordering F(Lon)ENG in S01, but that has it's own risks. The last thing England should be looking for is a bounce(2) in the Channel! (I'll discuss this more under Southern openings.) And unless England uses a Northern opening she can't rely on taking Norway at all.
If England uses either Northern opening, she is looking to secure Norway and is not interested in going after France immediately. The downside of a Northern opening is that England is not going to be able to go after France very quickly, so that is a problem that she must feel she can resolve later in the game. Northern openings are safe openings and predictable, so England must make the most of them.
One question remains: Assuming England is going after Norway, does she occupy it with an army or a fleet?
There are two reasons for England to occupy Norway in 1901: to get a safe(ish) SC and/or to move against Russia. Occupying Norway is the launchpad for an attack on Russia, so let's assume that this is the objective. First Norway, then St Petersburg; if England is thinking first Norway, then Sweden, then St Petersburg, she is being more long-term in her thinking... but also leaving herself more vulnerable.
If England occupies Norway with an army, she is giving herself a fair chance of getting that army into St Petersburg. As mentioned above, this offers more opportunities to occupy Russian space. The problem is that, as soon as an army lands in Norway, England is telegraphing her intent.
In actuality, a fleet occupying Norway is no less of a threat to St Petersburg as an army. The difference is that, once an English fleet occupies St Petersburg, it is stuck. It can't move forward. This is known as the "St Petersburg Cul-de-sac".
So, it has to be an army in Norway and then St Petersburg, doesn't it? Don't want to be trapped in the cul-de-sac, after all. And that is why a number of writers and commentators tell us it has to be an army in Norway if England wants to take St Petersburg.
Well, here's the thing: if England gets her army into St Petersburg, what does she do with it? Does it push south into Moscow? Maybe Livonia? After all, that's the aim of getting it there. And, if you're England, how do you achieve this?
Being realistic, England isn't going to be able to take Moscow on her own for a number of turns. Russia is going to have enough power in Moscow to hold England off - it only takes one, after all.
So, Livonia, then. That clears St Petersburg for, presumably, a second army to come in behind the first. But that's going to take some time in itself. And the assumption must be English armies in Livonia and St Petersburg will be enough to take Moscow on their own, which is unlikely.
The only way England is going to make progress against Russia in the early part of the Mid-game is if she gets help, and the three candidates for this are Germany, Austria or Turkey, with Germany being the most likely. England orders StP-Lvn, helps Germany take Warsaw, then Germany helps England take Moscow. Fairly uncomplicated.
However, this seems unlikely to me, unless things in the south are incredibly helpful. If England and Germany are in St Petersburg and Warsaw, Russia is most likely fatally wounded, which should mean that her southern enemies have take advantage of that. It's entirely possible that Galicia, Ukraine and Sevastopol are all occupied by enemy powers, and probably that at least two of the three are. Russia may only hold Moscow at this point.
Given this, Moscow is the prize. I can see the argument that Germany might help England take Moscow, but she might just as easily have formed an agreement with Austria to take it herself (or temporarily[?] give it to Austria). If there is no double dealing here from Germany, then the Anglo-German alliance (that I call the Saxon Alliance) is likely to face the an Austro-Turkish alliance (the Osturk Alliance) competing for Moscow. I feel, then, that England faces a long haul to take Moscow at this point in the game so why waste the time trying to take it?
The additional factor to getting an army into St Petersburg this early on is that, even if England is aiming to move it south immediately (and if she isn't, then surely it can be put to better use elsewhere?), she's going to be pressured to do something with it. Germany will want to push east and want English support; Austria or Turkey may want to push into Russia and want English support. This may be something England is prepared to do, of course, and it may be the key to forming a positive relationship with another power, but in the long term, getting Germany into Warsaw, or Austria/Turkey into Moscow, is going to make things trickier later in the game when England is going to be looking to take Moscow. And if England decides that she doesn't want to help her opponents, then she's damaging potential relationships.
Given this, and the fact that a fleet in St Petersburg is absolutely no use for further progress against Russia, should England even be looking to take St Petersburg? A lot of writers say not. There is some disagreement as to whether should look to take Norway, although I think it's generally accepted that England runs a risk by not doing so. But St Petersburg is another matter: stay clear is what a lot of advice says.
I disagree. If England is in Norway, if she has the chance of taking St Petersburg and she doesn't see a downside to damaging Russia, England she take St Petersburg, whether with a fleet or an army. For me, it I'd be perfectly happy with a fleet in St Petersburg at this stage of the game because it gives England a chance (even if only a slim one) to persuade Russia that St Petersburg's gone but that's the end of it.
Let's be pragmatic: Norway and St Petersburg are SCs. Taking them adds to England's strength. While she may be able to gain SCs elsewhere, of she takes Norway and St Petersburg with fleets, they are pretty much self-sustaining (admittedly, she'll possibly need a third unit in the region to guarantee this).
At this point in the game, it really doesn't matter if a fleet sits in St Petersburg. Assuming England makes good progress, she should find the opportunity later in the game to get an army into St Petersburg and use it to take Moscow then. This will probably depend upon England being in complete control of the northern seas but, really, that's what she ought to be aiming for anyway.
Part of the problem with commentary the is against England taking St Petersburg with a fleet in the early stages of a game is that it is based on a faulty philosophy that England needs armies just as much as fleets in the Early and early Mid-game. She doesn't. England needs fleets. She's a maritime power, she doesn't need to take inland SCs at this point. She will do, eventually, but she's not going to find it easy until she's secured the seas and the easier to grab coastal SCs. Throwing English armies onto the Continent is a mistake, as it leaves her vulnerable and there's no reason why it can't be done later in the game. It isn't coincidence that England finds survival comparatively easy but victory comparatively difficult: she's often played as if she were France, or Italy, where a balanced build strategy makes sense, or by people who think grabbing inland SCs and getting armies into play is important. Let the continental powers fight over the inland SCs and establish England's powerbase by taking coastal ones - with fleets.
Of the Northern openings, then, England's best option is probably the Tyne opening. It doesn't compromise the taking of Norway, and in fact is the only opening that will guarantee it if it's followed by F(NTH) C Yor-Nwy, F(NWG) S Yor-Nwy OR F(NWG) S NTH-Nwy, which frees A(Yor) to defend London if need be. It's this potential defence of London that makes the Tyne superior to the Churchill.